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IN DEFENSE OF IMPERFECT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 
AMITAI AVIRAM* 
ABSTRACT 
 In Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model, 
Professor Krawiec argues that organizations have perverse incentives to 
implement ineffective compliance programs and supports this argument 
with a survey of empirical research. Based on her argument, she urges 
that organizations be held strictly liable for corporate crimes (in terms of 
both guilt and punishment), regardless of the implementation of a com-
pliance program by the accused organization. Assuming arguendo that 
criminal law’s current treatment of compliance programs gives organi-
zations an incentive to design inefficient programs, this Comment posits 
that corporate crime may be better deterred if criminal law embraces, 
rather than remains agnostic to, compliance programs. 
 First, Krawiec’s policy suggestion overstates the impact of the legal 
sanction on corporate behavior. The legal sanction is only one of sev-
eral sanctions imposed for organizational misconduct. The public rela-
tions effect of misconduct may harm organizations more than any le-
gal sanction, giving them an incentive to implement compliance pro-
grams that assure the public of the organization’s compliance with the 
law. Second, Krawiec does not consider utility that is derived from re-
ducing the public’s subjective perception of the likelihood of miscon-
duct. This “placebo effect,” which exists regardless of whether a com-
pliance program is objectively effective, may increase utility by offset-
ting behavioral biases that cause the public to overestimate the prob-
ability of organizational misconduct. 
 I. INTRODUCTION.....................................................................................................  763 
 II. CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS AND KRAWIEC’S CRITIQUE OF THEM ......  766 
 III. THE IMPACT OF NONLEGAL SANCTIONS ON CORPORATE COMPLIANCE ..............  769 
 IV. THE PLACEBO EFFECT OF IMPERFECT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS........................  773 
 V. KRAWIEC’S ARTICLE—SOME OF ITS CONTRIBUTIONS, QUALIFICATIONS, AND 
COUNTER-QUALIFICATIONS .................................................................................  778 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Criminal liability can attach to an organization1 whenever an em-
ployee of the organization commits an act within the scope of her em-
                                                                                                                    
 * Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law. LL.B., Tel-Aviv Uni-
versity, 1995; LL.M., University of Chicago, 2000; J.S.D., University of Chicago, 2003. 
 1. An organization is defined in the U.S. Criminal Code as “a person other than an individual.” 
18 U.S.C. § 18 (2000). This definition includes “corporations, partnerships, associations, joint-stock 
companies, unions, trusts, pension funds, unincorporated organizations, governments and political 
subdivisions thereof, and non-profit organizations.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.1, 
cmt. n.1  (2004)   [hereinafter  SENTENCING GUIDELINES],   available at http://www.ussc.gov/2004guid/ 
gl2004.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2005). This Comment will focus on corporations and corporate mis-
conduct, though the same analysis will usually apply to all organizations. 
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ployment,2 even if the employee acted contrary to company policy and in-
structions.3 To mitigate organizations’ liability for employees’ unauthor-
ized criminal acts and to create incentives for organizations to self-police, 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission amended the Sentencing Guidelines to 
consider the adoption by an organization of an “effective compliance and 
ethics program.”4 Such programs are known simply as compliance pro-
grams. 
 The existence or absence of a compliance program that is deemed 
effective by the Guidelines has substantial effects on an organiza-
tion’s liability: the existence of an effective compliance program 
might reduce an organization’s sentence,5 the absence of an effective 
program may be a reason for the court to place an organization on 
probation,6 and the implementation of an effective program may be a 
condition of probation for organizations.7 Government responses to 
the recent series of corporate scandals have increased the emphasis 
on compliance programs as key elements in mitigating corporate 
misconduct. Notably, amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines im-
pose stricter criteria for a compliance program to be considered effec-
tive and elevate these criteria from commentary into a separate 
guideline.8 
                                                                                                                    
 2. For a survey of the development of corporate criminal liability, see V.S. Khanna, 
Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1479-
89 (1996). 
 3. For example, in 1909 the United States Supreme Court stated: 
 It is now well established that in actions for tort the corporation may be held 
responsible for damages for the acts of its agent within the scope of his em-
ployment. 
 And this is the rule when the act is done by the agent in the course of his em-
ployment, although done wantonly or recklessly or against the express orders of 
the principal. . . . 
 . . . . 
 In this case we are to consider the criminal responsibility of a corporation for 
an act done while an authorized agent of the company is exercising the author-
ity conferred upon him. . . . Applying the principle governing civil liability, we 
go only a step farther . . . by imputing [an agent’s] act to his employer and im-
posing penalties upon the corporation for which he is acting in the premises. 
N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493-94 (1909) (cita-
tions omitted). 
 4. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 8B2.1. On the development and goals of 
the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, see Diana E. Murphy, The Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines for Organizations: A Decade of Promoting Compliance and Ethics, 87 IOWA L. 
REV. 697 (2002). 
 5. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 8C2.5(f). 
 6. Id. § 8D1.1(a)(3). 
 7. Id. § 8D1.4(c)(1). 
 8. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 109-28 
(2004) [hereinafter 2004 AMENDMENTS], available at http://www.ussc.gov/2004guid/ 
RFMay04.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2005); see also News Release, U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion, Commission Tightens Requirements for Corporate Compliance and Ethics Programs 
(May 3, 2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/PRESS/rel0504.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 
2005). 
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 Not all scholars endorse government’s increasing emphasis on 
compliance programs. In Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the 
Principal-Agent Model,9 Kimberly Krawiec suggests that liability 
should be agnostic to the implementation of compliance programs. 
Krawiec argues that judges are unable to assess the effectiveness of 
compliance programs and, therefore, cannot identify ineffective pro-
grams that are implemented solely to reduce the organization’s li-
ability.10 Indeed, claims Krawiec, empirical research of compliance 
programs does not indicate that they are, in fact, effective.11 A sen-
tencing policy that is indifferent to an organization’s adoption of a 
compliance program will, therefore, encourage programs that are ef-
fective but avoid the pitfall of rewarding those programs that are 
mere “window dressing.”12 
 This Comment challenges Krawiec’s critique in two ways. First, it 
argues that Krawiec’s policy suggestion overstates the impact of the 
legal sanction on corporate behavior. The legal sanction is only one of 
several sanctions imposed for organizational misconduct. The public 
relations effect of misconduct may harm organizations more than any 
legal sanction, giving them an incentive to implement compliance 
programs that assure the public of the organization’s compliance 
with the law. 
 Second, in assessing the benefits of compliance programs, Krawiec 
considers solely the utility derived from objectively reducing miscon-
duct and does not consider utility that is derived from reducing the 
public’s subjective perception of the likelihood of misconduct. This 
latter effect exists whether a compliance program is objectively effec-
tive or not and therefore has been called the “placebo effect” of the 
compliance program.13 As explained below,14 a reduction in the per-
ceived likelihood of misconduct increases utility by offsetting behav-
ioral biases that cause individuals to overestimate the probability of 
organizational misconduct. 
 The rest of this Comment will proceed as follows: Part II explains 
briefly what compliance programs are and why Krawiec believes that 
law should be agnostic to their existence in judging the organizations 
that implement them. A more in-depth (and very good) discussion of 
compliance programs can be found in Krawiec’s article.15 Parts III 
                                                                                                                    
 9. Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent 
Model, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 571 (2005). 
 10. Id. at 580-81. 
 11. Id. at 591-97. 
 12. Id. at 574. 
 13. Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law (Nov. 24, 2004) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author). The cited paper develops the theory of placebo effects that is 
discussed in this Comment. Portions of Parts I and IV are based on the cited paper. 
 14. See infra Part IV. 
 15. Krawiec, supra note 9, at 582-97. 
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and IV raise critiques of and qualifications to Krawiec’s endorsement 
of a strict liability regime. After addressing some critiques previously 
raised against strict liability regimes and Krawiec’s response to 
them, Part III explains the first of two novel critiques of Krawiec’s 
argument: even if law offers organizations an incentive to design in-
effective, “window dressing” compliance programs, organizations still 
have an incentive to implement effective programs because they are 
subject to nonlegal sanctions for their misconduct. Part IV explains 
the second response to Krawiec’s argument: even if compliance pro-
grams are imperfect in their prevention of organizational miscon-
duct, they may increase social welfare by causing the public to per-
ceive misconduct as less likely. This, in turn, triggers a placebo effect 
that offsets behavioral biases that cause the public to overestimate 
the likelihood of misconduct and therefore take excessive precautions 
against misconduct. Part V provides concluding remarks. 
II.   CORPORATE COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS AND KRAWIEC’S CRITIQUE  
 OF THEM  
 Compliance programs are quite commonplace, at least among 
large businesses. Over ninety percent of Fortune 500 companies and 
over seventy-five percent of other large corporations report having an 
ethics or conduct code.16 Compliance programs are, generally, volun-
tary operations.17 As such, they may take any form that the imple-
menting firm desires. Thus, the firm is free to structure its compli-
ance program in the manner it believes is optimal to mitigate mis-
conduct and assure employees, customers, suppliers, government, or 
the public that it is mitigating misconduct. 
 Compliance programs tend to converge, however, around a gov-
ernment standard. As Krawiec describes, criminal law is more leni-
ent toward companies that implement certain compliance pro-
grams.18 Section 8B2.1 of the Guidelines,19 added recently by the 
2004 amendments, sets certain standards that compliance programs 
must satisfy in order to reduce the culpability score (and hence the 
sentence) of an offending organization20 or satisfy the probation re-
                                                                                                                    
 16. Id. at 583 n.30 (citing Andrew Brien, Regulating Virtue: Formulating, Engender-
ing and Enforcing Corporate Ethical Codes, 15 BUS. & PROF. ETHICS J. 21, 21 (1996), and 
Gary R. Weaver et al., Corporate Ethics Practices in the Mid-1990’s: An Empirical Study of 
the Fortune 1000, 18 J. BUS. ETHICS 283 (1999)). 
 17. There are some involuntary compliance programs. For example, an organization 
may be obligated to develop and implement a compliance program as one of the conditions 
of probation under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, 
§ 8D1.4(c)(1). 
 18. See Krawiec, supra note 9, at 579, 584-85. 
 19. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 8B2.1. 
 20. Id. § 8C2.5(f). 
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quirements imposed on an offending organization.21 Following this 
standard not only allows firms to receive more lenient treatment un-
der federal criminal law but also increases the likelihood that the 
public (employees, customers, suppliers, and others) would perceive 
the compliance program as effective, using the government standard 
as a benchmark. 
 Formally, an organization is strictly liable under federal criminal 
law for most actions that its employees commit within the scope of 
their employment.22 Under a strict liability standard, the degree of 
care taken by the organization to prevent the misconduct is irrele-
vant; if misconduct occurs, the organization is liable.23 Of course, a 
higher level of care24 may reduce the likelihood or severity of miscon-
duct and so indirectly reduce liability. Unlike a negligence stan-
dard,25 however, a strict liability regime focuses on the output of the 
activity (that is, whether the result was a crime) rather than on the 
inputs of the activity (that is, whether the organization did what was 
reasonably within its means to prevent misconduct). One may con-
sider a strict liability standard to be agnostic to the inputs of an ac-
tivity (that is, the level of care). 
 Because the Guidelines may reduce the culpability score (and thus 
the sentence) of offending organizations that implement compliance 
programs, they are not completely agnostic to that aspect of care. 
True, under the Guidelines the implementation of a program would 
not affect liability, but it would affect the sanction. While the execu-
tives of an organization likely have personal moral preferences not to 
violate the law, the magnitude of the sanction probably also affects 
the amount of attention and resources that they allocate to prevent-
ing misconduct. Thus, the Guidelines are considered a composite re-
gime rather than a strict liability one.26 
 Krawiec argues that, in practice, large segments of federal law are 
composite regimes rather than strict liability regimes as they purport 
to be.27 For example, the U.S. Department of Justice considers 
whether organizations implement compliance programs in deciding 
whether to criminally charge organizations for the acts of their em-
                                                                                                                    
 21. Id. § 8D1.4(c).  
 22. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text. 
 23. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.5 (6th ed. 2003) (ad-
dressing strict liability in tort law); id. § 7.5, at 234; id. § 7.7 (addressing strict liability in 
criminal law). 
 24. Examples of a higher level of care include setting clear work procedures that com-
ply with the law, educating employees about these procedures and relevant laws, and de-
tecting and punishing violations by employees. 
 25. See POSNER, supra note 23, § 6.1 (explaining the Hand formula for negligence in 
tort law); id. § 7.7 (addressing negligence in criminal law). 
 26. See Krawiec, supra note 9, at 584. 
 27. Id. at 585-91. 
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ployees and agents.28 Similarly, the Environmental Protection 
Agency and the Department of Health and Human Services allow re-
duced civil penalties and, in some cases, no criminal penalties for or-
ganizations with effective internal compliance structures.29 Survey-
ing several additional areas of law, Krawiec demonstrates that many 
areas of federal criminal law follow a composite regime that consid-
ers the implementation of compliance programs in determining li-
ability, sanction, or whether to prosecute the case.30 
 Compared to a strict liability regime, a composite regime in-
creases the likelihood that organizations will implement compliance 
programs, while it reduces the average sentence received by organi-
zations with compliance programs. The implementation of a compli-
ance program usually increases social welfare,31 while the reduction 
of the sentence (in itself) may reduce social welfare.32 
 Krawiec challenges the efficiency of composite regimes to the ex-
tent that they consider the implementation of compliance programs. 
According to her, judges, juries, and agencies are not able to correctly 
assess the effectiveness of a compliance program.33 This Comment 
does not challenge that argument. Under that assumption, Krawiec 
anticipates that organizations will form compliance programs that 
have sufficient content to persuade courts and agencies of their effec-
tiveness, but they will not invest additional resources to make the 
programs fully effective in mitigating misconduct. At the extreme, 
compliance programs would be “window dressing” with no effect on 
misconduct, even though they shield the organizations from liability. 
 If compliance programs are indeed “window dressing,” argues 
Krawiec, they do not enhance social welfare. On the other hand, or-
ganizations implementing these programs benefit from a reduction in 
sentences (and sometimes, the privilege of not being prosecuted), 
which is likely to reduce deterrence of their misconduct and therefore 
increase misconduct and reduce social welfare. The net effect, argues 
                                                                                                                    
 28. Id. at 585-86. 
 29. Id. at 585. 
 30. Id. at 586-91. 
 31. Implementing a compliance program increases social welfare in two ways. First, 
to the extent that the program is objectively effective, it prevents, deters, and stops mis-
conduct. Second, if the program reduces the public’s subjective assessment of the likelihood 
of misconduct, it may cause placebo effects, which may increase (and less frequently, de-
crease) social welfare. For more about placebo effects, see infra Part IV. For more about 
the situations in which they do not increase social welfare, see infra Part V. 
 32. Reducing a sentence due to the implementation of a compliance program may re-
duce social welfare if the compliance program itself has no or very little utility and if, prior 
to reduction, the sentence was set at the optimal level. If the sentence was previously 
higher than the optimal level, then the reduction of the sentence may increase social wel-
fare. But if a lower sentence is optimal, it would be so not only for organizations with com-
pliance programs but also for those which do not implement them. 
 33. Krawiec, supra note 9, at 580-81. 
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Krawiec, is socially harmful; therefore, organizational crime would 
be more effectively deterred if the law were agnostic to the imple-
mentation of compliance programs. In the following two Parts, this 
Comment will address some critiques of and qualifications to 
Krawiec’s argument. 
III.   THE IMPACT OF NONLEGAL SANCTIONS ON CORPORATE 
COMPLIANCE 
 One may challenge Krawiec’s conclusion that organizations will 
opt for sham compliance programs by noting that effective compli-
ance programs reduce misconduct and, therefore, liability. Would not 
an organization prefer a compliance program that prevents miscon-
duct and thus removes all liability to one that does not prevent mis-
conduct but only reduces the sanction for the misconduct? 
 Krawiec raises this argument and responds to it by claiming that 
organizations benefit from many types of organizational miscon-
duct.34 Again, this Comment does not challenge that claim. If it is 
correct, then an organization may prefer an impotent compliance pro-
gram if it could benefit from both the misconduct that it does not 
prevent and from the degree of leniency that is afforded to firms that 
implement compliance programs. 
 But this response has limits. First, even if courts and agencies are 
incapable of identifying whether a compliance program is optimal, 
they can identify compliance programs that are completely impotent. 
The standards set in the Guidelines, as well as judges’ and regula-
tors’ common sense, will likely suffice to identify sham programs, 
even if judges and regulators cannot determine precisely how effec-
tive the program is. In an effort to persuade courts and agencies of 
the effectiveness of the program, the organization will have to make 
the program somewhat effective. Once the program is somewhat ef-
fective and prevents some (but not all) misconduct, the benefit from 
misconduct is reduced. For some organizations, this reduced level of 
benefit will be lower than the legal and extralegal costs of incurring 
liability for misconduct, and thus they self-interestedly refrain from 
any misconduct. 
 This is particularly true if misconduct that is most profitable to 
the organization is also most conspicuous to the courts and agencies. 
In that case, the court or agency would be aware of compliance pro-
grams that do not deal with such types of misconduct, and therefore 
the organization would have to fashion a compliance program that 
mitigates those forms of misconduct. Unable to allow the most profit-
able types of misconduct, the firm might find that the benefits to it 
                                                                                                                    
 34. Krawiec, supra note 9, at 601-10. 
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from less profitable forms of misconduct are outweighed by the costs 
of incurring liability for the misconduct (even if the sanction is miti-
gated because of the implementation of the compliance program). 
 There is another reason to doubt the assumption that organiza-
tions benefit from their employees’ misconduct so much that they re-
frain from implementing effective compliance programs. The legal 
sanctions that are affected by a change in the liability regime are 
only a portion of the sanctions that the organization suffers for its 
misconduct. For example, the accounting firm Arthur Andersen lost 
many of its clients in the wake of the Enron debacle, well before a le-
gal sanction was imposed upon it. 
 Scholars have documented how “courts of public opinion” deterred 
violation of norms where law could not reach or did not reach effec-
tively.35 For example, in antebellum South Carolina a woman was 
murdered by her husband and her sister Eliza (who married one an-
other soon after the murder). The husband was tried and convicted 
for the murder of his wife and sentenced to death. Eliza was not 
tried, apparently because the criminal legal system did not view 
women as legal actors.36 Nonetheless, she was sanctioned severely: 
Eliza “had been stripped of her adult status and reduced to her 
cousin’s ward. She had no access to her inheritance, except for what 
she received as an allowance or her guardian agreed to pay towards 
her expenses, nor was she given custody of her stepchildren . . . .”37 
All of these sanctions were not ordered by a court but were the re-
sponse of individuals in her community. The fact that the legal sys-
tem attached no liability to her actions did not prevent individuals 
from sanctioning her. 
 The “court of public opinion” also passes judgment on organiza-
tions. Corporations are spending vast amounts of money on programs 
that are intended to persuade the public that they do not violate 
norms held by their patrons or employees. Individuals boycott or-
ganizations that violate the individuals’ norms and support organiza-
tions that uphold the same norms. This informal “court” would sanc-
tion an organization for misconduct even if the legal system exoner-
ated the organization because it implemented a compliance program. 
 The greater the portion of nonlegal sanctions for misconduct, the 
lower the incentive for organizations to create impotent compliance 
programs, even if those suffice to shield the organization from crimi-
nal liability. For example, suppose Acme Corporation benefited $5 
                                                                                                                    
 35. See, e.g., Elizabeth Dale, A Different Sort of Justice: The Informal Courts of Public 
Opinion in Antebellum South Carolina, 54 S.C. L. REV. 627 (2003). 
 36. Id. at 635 (“The failure to convict, or even indict, Eliza seems to confirm that for-
mal law, influenced by the gendered assumptions of honor culture, could not conceive of 
women as legal actors.”). 
 37. Id. at 636 (footnotes omitted). 
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from a certain form of misconduct,38 and it would incur a cost of $3 to 
implement a compliance program that would be effective in eliminat-
ing the misconduct or a cost of $1 to implement a sham compliance 
program that does nothing to prevent misconduct. Also suppose that 
the law imposes a sanction of $10 for this form of misconduct but 
mitigates the sanction to $5 if an appropriate compliance program 
was implemented.39 Finally, assume (as Krawiec argues) that the 
court or agency administering the sanction cannot tell the effective 
compliance program from the sham program and would impose the 
mitigated sanction on an organization that implemented either. 
Acme can also suffer nonlegal sanctions by losing the patronage of 
customers, the loyalty of employees, and the prospect of attracting 
potential customers or employees. Some of these individuals would 
believe in the effectiveness of the sham compliance program and 
would only sanction Acme if it did not implement any program. But 
others would sanction Acme unless it implemented the effective pro-
gram. Thus, Acme would suffer nonlegal sanctions of $6 (represent-
ing a boycott by many individuals) if it implemented no program, or 
sanctions of $3 (representing a boycott by a smaller number of indi-
viduals) if it implemented the sham program. 
 The corporation can choose (1) not to implement any compliance 
program, in which case Acme would benefit $5 from the misconduct 
but suffer a $10 legal sanction and a $6 nonlegal sanction, resulting 
in a net loss of $11; (2) implement a sham compliance program, in 
which case Acme would still benefit $5 from the misconduct, incur a 
$1 cost for the compliance program, and suffer only $5 in legal sanc-
tions, but also $3 in nonlegal sanctions, resulting in a net loss of $4; 
or (3) implement an effective compliance program, in which case no 
misconduct occurs, Acme spends $3 on the compliance program, and 
does not suffer any sanction, resulting in a net loss of $3. If not for 
the nonlegal sanctions, Acme would have opted to implement a sham 
program. Nonlegal sanctions, even though they were not as signifi-
cant in magnitude as the legal sanctions, sufficed to tip the balance 
of Acme’s incentives toward the implementation of an effective pro-
gram. This may occur even when only a small number of the sanc-
tioning individuals can differentiate between effective compliance 
programs and their sham counterparts. 
 
                                                                                                                    
 38. This assumption conforms with Krawiec’s argument that organizations often 
benefit from their employees’ misconduct. Of course, in situations where the organization 
does not benefit from the misconduct, the organization would have even greater incentive 
to implement an effective program. 
 39. For purposes of simplicity, we assume a 100% probability that misconduct will be 
detected. One can reduce that probability and increase the sanctions accordingly without 
modifying the outcome of the calculation. 
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 The results above are highly dependent on the numerical assump-
tions we make and therefore do not prove that nonlegal sanctions 
always suffice to cause organizations to implement effective compli-
ance programs. Rather, they demonstrate that nonlegal sanctions 
may have that effect, even under the unlikely assumptions that the 
legal system can never recognize “window dressing” compliance pro-
grams and that the organization always benefits from the miscon-
duct. 
 More important, this calculus demonstrates the possible ineffec-
tiveness of the remedy Krawiec advocates—indifference to the im-
plementation of compliance programs. The greater the ratio of nonle-
gal sanctions to legal sanctions, the less the legal liability standard 
matters.40 If the criminal sanctions are minor compared to the nonle-
gal sanctions, a shift to a strict liability regime would hardly modify 
organizations’ incentives: they would focus on avoiding the nonlegal 
sanction (or, if that sanction is lower than the combined cost of the 
compliance program and benefit from the misconduct, they would ig-
nore the sanctions altogether). 
 Even if a shift to a strict liability regime has a limited effect on 
organizations’ incentives, it certainly has some effect. Why not im-
pose a strict liability regime anyway? A well-known weakness of the 
strict liability regime is that it creates an incentive for the organiza-
tion not to police misconduct that it believes can be hidden from the 
public and prosecutors.41 For example, if Acme Corporation’s man-
agement discovers that despite their efforts to prevent misconduct, 
an Acme employee had violated the law and due to the strict liability 
regime Acme would be vicariously responsible, Acme may try to con-
ceal the misconduct in the hope of avoiding its repercussions. Simi-
larly, when constructing its compliance program, Acme would em-
phasize preventive measures (since those decrease the occurrence of 
misconduct and thus its liability), but it would not implement detec-
tion measures (since once misconduct occurred, it would be best for 
Acme to keep attention away from it).42 Conversely, under a negli-
gence regime (and, to a lesser extent, under a composite regime) 
Acme would not incur liability if it implemented a program that both 
policed and prevented misconduct, even if misconduct occurred. On 
the other hand, Acme would incur liability for misconduct if its com-
                                                                                                                    
 40. The effect of the legal standard may extend somewhat beyond the legal sanction, 
since some individuals may use the legal standard as their benchmark in assessing 
whether an organization is deserving of a sanction. However, many individuals have stan-
dards that are independent of the legal standard. 
 41. Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An 
Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 708 (1997); Jennifer Arlen, 
The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 
840 (1994). 
 42. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 41, at 701-02. 
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pliance program made no effort to police misconduct (and was there-
fore an unreasonably low level of care that amounts to negligence). 
Therefore, under a negligence regime Acme is more likely to opt for a 
compliance program that is recognized by the court as sufficient, 
even if the program uncovers misconduct that would otherwise be 
hidden. So, while a negligence standard may somewhat reduce deter-
rence of the organization, it may increase deterrence of the individ-
ual perpetrator (by increasing the probability of the misconduct be-
ing detected). 
 Krawiec responds to Arlen and Kraakman’s critique by suggest-
ing a modification to the pure strict liability regime: “Firms can still 
be encouraged to engage in internal policing and cooperation with 
government authorities through some combination of evidentiary 
privilege rules and reduced sanctions for cooperation with govern-
ment investigations.”43 
 But Krawiec’s remedies only address the legal sanction. Eviden-
tiary privileges do not assuage the public’s suspicion of misconduct; 
they may agitate it. And reduced sentences for cooperation do not 
assure the public that future misconduct is less likely, as would a 
compliance program. Therefore, under a strict liability regime, an 
organization that exposes misconduct risks nonlegal sanctions even 
if legal sanctions are mitigated. 
 One must be cautious in assessing the role of nonlegal sanctions: 
just as the legal system may be unable to assess correctly the effec-
tiveness of compliance programs, so can private parties err. The ex-
istence of nonlegal sanctions has two effects on our analysis. First, 
as mentioned above, they reduce the impact of a change in the legal 
standard. Second, they cause organizations to tailor their compli-
ance programs and other activities so as not only to fit legal stan-
dards but also to persuade the public of the program’s effectiveness. 
This obviously increases social welfare if the public can recognize 
what constitutes an effective compliance program (and thus force 
the organization to implement it). But the next Part explains why 
social welfare may increase if a compliance program persuades the 
public of its effectiveness despite not being optimal from an objec-
tive perspective. 
IV.   THE PLACEBO EFFECT OF IMPERFECT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 
 Government endorsement of compliance programs may be benefi-
cial even when government is limited in its ability to assess the effec-
tiveness of the program and, in fact, even when the program is not ef-
                                                                                                                    
 43. Krawiec, supra note 9, at 577. Krawiec goes on to describe specific modifications 
to the strict liability regime that would induce organizations to police and cooperate with 
government investigations. Id. at 577-79. 
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fective. Although counterintuitive, this idea posited in this Part is 
that beyond the benefits derived from the effectiveness of the compli-
ance program, the implementation of such a program may have a 
placebo effect—generating benefits that result simply from the im-
plementation of a program that is perceived to be effective by the 
people it affects. 
 The placebo effect is beneficial because it counters a tendency, 
well-documented in the behavioral literature, of overestimating risks 
that are salient to us.44 Such overestimation causes individuals to re-
duce activities that may subject them to the risk, well beyond the ac-
tivity reduction that would be efficient even if the risk were left un-
checked. 
 For example, suppose that there is a 5% probability that any 
given U.S. company would commit corporate fraud that would elimi-
nate a substantial portion of its shareholders’ investment. Knowing 
this, investors are less likely to purchase shares and are more likely 
to invest elsewhere (for example, in foreign companies) or consume 
their wealth rather than invest it. Many investors may not be de-
terred from investing in a company because of a 5% probability of 
fraud, especially if their opportunity costs are low (for example, this 
investment looks much more attractive than the next best alterna-
tive). But on the margin, some investors will decide that the risk of 
fraud makes other uses of their wealth more attractive and will 
therefore refrain from investing in U.S. companies. Naturally, the 
number of people who would refrain from investing in U.S. compa-
nies will increase as the perceived risk of fraud increases. 
 If fraud can be prevented by the legal system, investors need not 
react to this risk because the threat of legal sanction would discipline 
the companies. However, the legal system is imperfect, and compa-
nies may find that 5% of the time they can commit fraud in a way 
that cannot be detected or proven in court. If a 5% fraud rate is inevi-
table (in the sense that the most effective law enforcement cannot 
reduce fraud below 5%), some reduction in investment (presumably 
in the least promising companies) is the most efficient response to 
the risk of fraud.45 
 
                                                                                                                    
 44. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1119 (2002) (book 
review); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974). 
 45. This is analogous to economic analysis of strict liability in tort law. See POSNER, 
supra note 23, § 6.5. In effect, an injured party is “strictly liable” for injuries inflicted on it 
that cannot or are not prohibited by public and private legal systems, in the sense that the 
risk of injury would cause them to (1) take the optimal degree of care to avoid injury when 
feasible to avoid injury and to (2) reduce their activities that run the risk of this type of in-
jury when the optimal level of care is insufficient to avoid injury. Id. 
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 Note, however, that the number of people reducing investment 
depends on the perceived risk of fraud rather than on the actual risk. 
If something artificially increased the perceived risk of fraud above 
the actual risk, people would decrease their investment in U.S. com-
panies more than would be warranted by the risk. For example, if the 
risk of fraud were 5%, but investors perceived it at 50%, a much lar-
ger number of investors would reluctantly refrain from investing. 
From both the individual’s perspective and that of society, this is a 
loss. Correcting this overestimation of risk would enhance welfare. 
 But why would investors overestimate the risk of corporate fraud? 
The answer lies in behavioral psychology. There is a rich literature 
that documents situations in which individuals are biased to overes-
timate probabilities and, in particular, risks. The availability bias 
causes people to “assess the frequency of a class or the probability of 
an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be 
brought to mind.”46 As a result of this bias, “highly publicized events 
make people fearful of statistically small risks.”47 Compounding this 
bias is the “social amplification” phenomenon, which causes people to 
perceive as more probable those risks that also concern others with 
whom they interact.48 The combination of these two forces causes the 
probability of risks that are highly publicized to be significantly 
overestimated: the availability bias causes each person to individu-
ally overestimate the risk, and encountering others who have the 
same apprehension (because of exposure to information on the same 
highly publicized risk) exacerbates further the perceived probability 
of the risk. 
 Because it grossly overestimates highly publicized risks, the pub-
lic avoids these risks excessively. To respond to this inefficiency (and 
alleviate public concerns), governments and private parties alike try 
to take actions that have a placebo effect; that is, actions that, be-
sides reducing the actual risk, also (and often, first and foremost) re-
duce the perceived risk by assuring the public that they are effective 
responses. That an action has placebo effects does not mean that it is 
a placebo—effective responses are usually more likely than ineffec-
tive ones to assure the public of their effectiveness. However, wel-
fare-enhancing effects of actions that have placebo effects extend be-
yond mitigating the risk that they address. Therefore, given a choice 
between two courses of action with similar ability to mitigate a 
threat, society would benefit from picking a course of action that cre-
ates a placebo effect. 
 
                                                                                                                    
 46. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 44, at 1127. 
 47. Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1127. 
 48. On social amplification, see Sunstein, supra note 44, at 1130-37. 
776  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:763 
 
 Actions that have placebo effects tend to be swift (since they re-
spond to risks perceived to be highly threatening), decisive (to per-
suade that they are effective), and highly publicized (to benefit, like 
the threats they attempt to counter, from the availability bias and 
social amplification). When undertaken by the government, some ac-
tions take the form of executive action (for example, changes in the 
monetary policy),49 others take the form of legislation (for example, 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act), and yet others combine both legislative and 
executive action (for example, FDR’s New Deal). Private parties also 
take actions that have placebo effects, particularly against threats 
that are perceived by the public to be more effectively dealt with pri-
vately, rather than through government. 
 How do placebo effects impact the debate on corporate compliance 
programs? In addition to their role in mitigating corporate miscon-
duct, compliance programs also serve to assure the potential victims 
that they will not be harmed. If potential victims overestimate the 
risk of misconduct, then the reduction in perceived risk (as long as it 
does not drive perceived risk below the actual risk) will enhance so-
cial welfare. 
 To have a significant placebo effect, the risk of corporate miscon-
duct must be overestimated by many individuals and the compliance 
program should be perceived by the same people as reducing the risk 
of misconduct. In addition, for compliance programs to be efficient, 
they must not preclude a significantly more efficient response to cor-
porate misconduct.50 
 The risk of corporate misconduct is particularly susceptible to be-
ing overestimated. Popular culture frequently portrays big business 
and the capitalists that control it as evil, calculating, and heartless.51 
For example, several popular movies portray managers callously de-
frauding or manipulating shareholders.52 Though the audience is 
                                                                                                                    
 49. The effect of a monetary policy is, in fact, primarily a placebo effect. For example, 
an expansive monetary policy (reducing the interest rate) increases economic development 
because people believe that it does. Its objective effect, increasing the supply of money, has 
little effect in itself because without the subjective belief in its effect, it would cause infla-
tion that would devaluate money to its former value. 
 50. This latter requirement seems to be satisfied as far as the Guidelines’ treatment 
of compliance programs is concerned: compliance programs do not hinder any government 
action to curb corporate misconduct and do not eliminate incentives for the company to po-
lice itself effectively, since the company still suffers significant noncriminal sanctions for 
its misconduct. 
 51. See, e.g., Carol B. Swanson, The Turn in Takeovers: A Study in Public Appease-
ment and Unstoppable Capitalism, 30 GA. L. REV. 943, 957-58, 969-70 (1996); Larry E. 
Ribstein, Film and Firms (July 7, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=563181 (last visited Jan. 10, 2005). 
 52. E.g., THE HUDSUCKER PROXY (Warner Bros. 1994) (managers conspire to appoint 
an incompetent CEO to drive share prices down so that they can acquire control of the 
company); THE SOLID GOLD CADILLAC (Columbia TriStar 1956) (managers overcompensate 
themselves, manipulate shareholder meetings, and patronize small shareholders). 
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aware that the movies portray fictitious events, the movie makes 
corporate fraud more vivid and creates a sense of familiarity with 
corporate fraud. This may trigger an availability bias and cause indi-
viduals to perceive corporate fraud as more likely. 
 Another cause for a difference between perceived and actual risk 
of corporate misconduct is the business cycle. Allegations of corporate 
misconduct seem to be more common when the alleged perpetrator is 
not meeting investor expectations. There are at least two explana-
tions for this pattern. First, it is easier for perpetrators to cover up 
their misdeeds when the company is expanding and its profits in-
creasing. Conversely, misconduct is harder to conceal when the com-
pany fails to meet expectations. Second, investors may be more trust-
ing when the economy is doing well and less forgiving when their in-
vestment does not fulfill their expectations.53 Business cycles cause 
many businesses’ prospects to improve and worsen at the same time, 
and therefore many companies decline at the same time, each becom-
ing more susceptible to allegations of misconduct. Awareness of 
many simultaneous allegations of wrongdoing biases individuals, 
causing them to overestimate the probability of wrongdoing. Signifi-
cant media coverage of these allegations contributes to the social 
amplification of the risk54 and portrays corporate misconduct as an 
epidemic.55 
 The other element required to make a placebo effect significant—
gaining the public’s confidence in compliance programs’ effective-
ness—presents a greater hurdle. Private parties may be perceived as 
benefiting from the misconduct56 and thus as lacking the incentive to 
self-police appropriately. On the other hand, popular culture seems 
to acknowledge and even emphasize a role for socially responsible 
companies.57 Individuals must decide whether to place a given com-
pany in the “good” or “bad” rubric and assess the perceived effective-
                                                                                                                    
 53. See Larry E. Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77 (2003). 
 54. This is not to say that media coverage of corporate misconduct is welfare-
reducing, only that it contributes to overestimating the threat and making corporate mis-
conduct seem ubiquitous. On the other hand, media coverage may deter some executives 
from wrongdoing by increasing both the probability of detection and the magnitude of pun-
ishment. “Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient po-
liceman.” LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW BANKERS USE IT 92 
(1914). 
 55. Due to the availability bias, media coverage of several similar events within a 
short time period may cause the public to grossly overestimate a risk. See Cass R. Sun-
stein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 758-59 & n.31 (2003) (“Many perceived 
‘epidemics’ are in reality no such thing, but instead a product of media coverage of grip-
ping, unrepresentative incidents.”). 
 56. See Krawiec, supra note 9, at 601-609. 
 57. See Ribstein, supra note 51 (manuscript at 26-27). 
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ness of their compliance programs accordingly.58 
 This is where government endorsement plays a significant role: 
Criminal enforcement that is agnostic to the implementation of com-
pliance programs—as proposed by Krawiec—sends a message to the 
public that compliance programs are ineffective. If companies are 
held strictly liable for all consequences of their misconduct, they may 
still implement the programs most effective in mitigating misconduct 
and reduce business activity that cannot be effectively self-policed. 
However, the public will not perceive the risk mitigated and thus will 
itself reduce activity that is affected by corporate misconduct. To 
prevent this loss of social welfare, the placebo effects of compliance 
programs must be embraced by signaling government’s belief that an 
effective compliance program will reduce the risk of misconduct. Do-
ing so through the Guidelines may be a sensible path. 
V.   KRAWIEC’S ARTICLE—SOME OF ITS CONTRIBUTIONS, 
QUALIFICATIONS, AND COUNTER-QUALIFICATIONS 
 Professor Krawiec’s article contributes to understanding how 
criminal law should address compliance programs. First, she points 
out that even in areas of criminal law, in which an organization is 
nominally strictly liable for its employees’ behavior, the actual liabil-
ity may be more akin to a negligence standard. This is so because the 
implementation of a compliance program might significantly reduce 
the sanction and even the probability of being prosecuted. While this 
insight does not prove the superiority of either a negligence regime or 
a strict liability one, it does reveal that the actual incentives that the 
legal system provides may differ from those it formally claims to 
give. This Comment argues, however, that the incentives given by 
the legal system may be less powerful than nonlegal sanctions. 
Nonlegal actors may hold an organization strictly liable for its mis-
conduct regardless of the legal standard. For example, a firm may 
implement a compliance program that shields itself from legal suits 
of racial discrimination yet be unable to attract qualified employees 
who believe that the firm is discriminating and is not legally liable 
merely due to a “technicality.” The risk of losing those employees 
(and perhaps the patronage of customers) may cause the firm to po-
lice its misconduct even when the legal system does not punish the 
firm for the misconduct; this is true even when the firm benefits from 
the misconduct. Thus, a change in the legal standard of liability may 
not cause a significant change in organizations’ incentives to police 
misconduct. 
                                                                                                                    
 58. The fact that companies engage in “PR activities” (well-publicized contributions to 
public causes) indicates that the public perceives some firms as “good” despite business’ 
generally negative stereotype. 
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 Another important insight offered by Krawiec is that empirical 
evidence does not demonstrate the effectiveness of compliance pro-
grams. This is not in opposition with the point made in this Com-
ment about nonlegal sanctions, because a firm can avoid nonlegal 
sanctions not only by effectively preventing misconduct but also (and 
more successfully) by being perceived as effectively preventing mis-
conduct. Thus, firms may implement a compliance program that 
seems to be effective but is not instead of one that is effective, if the 
former is less costly. 
 This Comment demonstrates, however, that a compliance pro-
gram may enhance social welfare if it reduces the public’s perceived 
risk of misconduct, even when the actual risk of misconduct is not af-
fected. In this situation, social welfare is enhanced by offsetting ex-
cessive avoidance of the risk due to behavioral biases that cause 
many individuals to overestimate the actual risk. For example, 
availability bias may cause an individual who is exposed to extensive 
media coverage of corporate scandals to overestimate the likelihood 
of corporate misconduct and excessively refrain from investing in 
companies. If the same individual believed that a corporation’s com-
pliance program was effective in reducing the likelihood of miscon-
duct, her assessment of that risk may be closer to the objective prob-
ability, and correspondingly her willingness to invest would be closer 
to the efficient level. 
 Placebo effects do not make all compliance programs efficient. 
First, to create a placebo effect an individual must believe that the 
compliance program reduces the likelihood of corporate misconduct, 
rather than being ineffective window dressing. Government en-
dorsement of such programs is an important criterion in fostering 
such belief. By eliminating preferential treatment of companies that 
implement compliance programs, as Professor Krawiec advocates, a 
signal would be sent that government does not view compliance pro-
grams as effective. This may reduce, or even eliminate, the placebo 
effect of compliance programs, including those programs that are ef-
fective in reducing misconduct. 
 Second, excessive placebo effects can decrease utility. Placebo ef-
fects are beneficial as long as they guide individuals closer to an ob-
jective assessment of the risk of misconduct. If placebo effects cause 
individuals to be overly optimistic about the likelihood of miscon-
duct,59 they may engage in excessive activity that is vulnerable to 
misconduct. For example, suppose that minority shareholders antici-
                                                                                                                    
 59. Placebo effects of a compliance program may be excessive (for example, reduce so-
cial welfare) when the behavioral biases that should cause individuals to overestimate the 
likelihood of misconduct are not significant, and therefore individuals perceive correctly 
the risk of misconduct. 
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pate a 10% probability of being oppressed by the majority stockhold-
ers and that this is precisely the objective likelihood of such miscon-
duct. Now suppose that new laws are enacted to protect minority 
stockholders. And suppose further that these laws reduce oppression 
by 1% (to 9%), but they are perceived by the public to reduce oppres-
sion by half (to 5%).60 The result would be that investors overinvest 
and expose themselves to a greater risk than they were willing to 
take. 
 This scenario, however, is not very likely. Legislation, compliance 
programs, and other actions of assurance rarely address a risk that 
does not excessively concern the public and that is not subject to 
availability bias and social amplification. Unless a risk concerns 
many people (thus causing social amplification) and is covered by 
many media venues (thus causing an availability bias), battling this 
risk may not be a worthwhile task for the politician (interested in 
votes of grateful constituents) or the corporate executive (interested 
in favorable public relations). 
 The third situation in which placebo effects of compliance pro-
grams are inefficient is when they preclude better responses to the 
same risk. If the implementation of persuasive (though not necessar-
ily effective) compliance programs were to preclude the employment 
of a more effective program, then the utility of the placebo effects 
may not compensate for the lost utility from better addressing the ob-
jective risk. As explained above, this does not seem to be the case 
with corporate compliance programs. If a firm has an incentive to 
implement an effective compliance program instead of a current 
“window dressing” program, it can do so. If it is efficient for govern-
ment or third parties to take action to mitigate misconduct, compli-
ance programs do not prevent them from doing so.61 
 Professor Krawiec’s article lays the foundation for a debate on the 
appropriate accommodations that law should afford to compliance 
programs and demonstrates some perverse incentives criminal law 
offers to creators of sham programs. The present Comment does not 
object to that argument but explains why establishing the validity of 
that argument does not necessarily condemn law’s endorsement of 
compliance programs. 
                                                                                                                    
 60. The same effect would occur if, instead of legislation, compliance programs were 
implemented with similar results (for example, reduction of oppression by 1% and reduc-
tion of the expectation of misconduct by 5%). 
 61. Under the Guidelines, the implementation of a compliance program may reduce a 
convicted firm’s fine. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 1, § 8C2.5(f). But this bene-
fit is relative to the fines paid by offenders that have not implemented compliance pro-
grams. If the reduced fines for compliance programs do not deter firms, government can 
raise the maximum sentence for the crime, increasing the deterrence of firms that have 
compliance programs while also maintaining the incentive for firms to have such pro-
grams. 
